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ABSTRACT The broadcast nature of wireless local area networks has made them prone to several types
of wireless injection attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) at the physical layer, deauthentication, and
rogue access point attacks. The implementation of novel intrusion detection systems (IDSs) is fundamental to
provide stronger protection against these wireless injection attacks. Since most attacks manifest themselves
through different metrics, current IDSs should leverage a cross-layer approach to help toward improving the
detection accuracy. The data fusion technique based on the Dempster–Shafer (D-S) theory has been proven
to be an efficient technique to implement the cross-layer metric approach. However, the dynamic generation
of the basic probability assignment (BPA) values used by D-S is still an open research problem. In this
paper, we propose a novel unsupervised methodology to dynamically generate the BPA values, based on
both the Gaussian and exponential probability density functions, the categorical probability mass function,
and the local reachability density. Then, D-S is used to fuse the BPA values to classify whether the Wi-Fi
frame is normal (i.e., non-malicious) or malicious. The proposed methodology provides 100% true positive
rate (TPR) and 4.23% false positive rate (FPR) for the MitM attack and 100% TPR and 2.44% FPR for the
deauthentication attack, which confirm the efficiency of the dynamic BPA generation methodology.
INDEX TERMS Basic probability assignment, data fusion, Dempster-Shafer theory, intrusion detection
system, local reachability density, network security, probability density function, wireless injection attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, wireless local area networks,
based on the IEEE 802.11 standard protocols (Wi-Fi),
have become prevalent. Nowadays, most of the personal
devices, laptops and smart phones are equipped with wire-
less connection capability. Furthermore, since the Inter-
net of Things (IoT) has emerged, the number of devices
connected to wireless networks is increasing rapidly [1].
Currently, there are more than 20 billion IoT devices con-
nected to the Internet, and that number is expected to reach
75 billions by 2025 [2]. Due to the ease of deployment, main-
tenance and low cost, these devices have become ubiquitous.
Consequently, securing this type of networks has become
a priority.
The broadcast nature of Wi-Fi has made the wireless
access open to new forms of cyber-attacks against the
IEEE 802.11 standard protocol [3]. Any wireless device
within the coverage area of the transmitter is able to intercept
the communication channel. This provides an opportunity for
attackers to eavesdrop and analyze the network communica-
tion. Moreover, the capability to inject malicious information
into the wireless communication, and the capacity to imper-
sonate the identity of legitimate network devices, allow an
attacker to launch several types of wireless injection attacks,
such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) at the physical layer [4],
de-authentication [5] and rogue access point [6].
Furthermore, Wi-Fi encryption systems, such as WPA2,
may fail under specific circumstances in guaranteeing
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Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). For
instance, in [7], Agarwal et al. describe how the vulnerability
Hole 196 can be used to inject a spoofed broadcast/multicast
frame in a WPA2 encrypted network. Wi-Fi networks require
encryption protocols, as well as intelligent and robust net-
work traffic monitoring mechanisms to defend themselves
against attacks targeting CIA.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a security system
designed to detect malicious activities within the network
by extracting and analyzing network traffic measurements.
Because most cyber-attacks manifest themselves through
different metrics, current IDSs should not be based on
a single metric, but should leverage a cross-layer metric
approach. Hence, the combined use ofmultiplemetrics across
various network stack layers can help towards improving the
IDS accuracy.
Data fusion techniques aim to integrate information from
multiple, usually heterogeneous, data sources to improve
the decision making, while decreasing the uncertainty in a
knowledge domain. As many researchers have previously
demonstrated, IDSs that make use of multiple metrics from
the same or different network stack layers, may improve their
Detection Rate (DR) while producing lower number of false
alarms [8], [9].
The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory of Evidence [10] is a
prime data fusion approach that inherently handles knowl-
edge representation and uncertainty reasoning [11]. D-S has
been proven to be a powerful and efficient data fusion tech-
nique in various network security related fields [12], [13].
However, there are still a number of issues associated with
D-S that need to be addressed. In particular, the generation of
the Basic Probability Assignment (BPA) values is of funda-
mental importance.
Although D-S depends directly on the BPA, it does not
dictate a specificmethodology to derive the belief values. Due
to this reason, few of the previously proposed methodologies
can dynamically and robustly generate the BPA values to be
used during the data fusion process of IDS. Therefore, this
issue is still a challenge to be addressed.
In this work, we propose a novel unsupervised method-
ology to dynamically generate the BPA values, based on a
robust and rigorous mathematical framework. The proposed
methodology employs both the Gaussian and exponential
probability density functions (pdf), the categorical proba-
bility mass function (pmf) [14], and the local reachability
density (lrd) [15]. It dynamically assigns BPA values for
each feature (i.e. metric) extracted fromWi-Fi frames, which
appropriately represent the real nature of the data. Then, the
D-S fusion is used to fuse the beliefs of each metric
in order to classify whether the Wi-Fi frame is normal
(i.e. non-malicious) or malicious.
The contribution of our work is summarized as follows:
Firstly, we propose a novel BPA generation methodology
that employs both Gaussian and exponential pdf, the categor-
ical pmf and the lrd. This methodology generates the beliefs
supporting the hypotheses of whether the network traffic is
normal or malicious. The combination of these techniques
dynamically assigns belief values depending on the current
characteristics of the network traffic, without intervention
from an IDS administrator. More importantly, the proposed
methodology operates in an unsupervised manner and, there-
fore, does not require labeled training data.
Secondly, the efficiency of the proposed BPAmethodology
in an IDS is evaluated for two types of wireless injection
attacks using a real network testbed: MitM attack at the phys-
ical layer and deauthentication attack. In total, five metrics
have been empirically selected from the network traffic to be
analyzed by our system in order to identify injection attacks.
The various metrics are extracted from different layers of the
protocol stack.
Thirdly, our network traffic datasets have been made
publicly available in [16], including the ground truth.
These datasets have been generated from a real Wi-Fi net-
work deployed at Loughborough University, UK. Given the
scarcity of publicly available labeled network traffic datasets,
making the data available would benefit the IDS research
community.
The main aims of the experiments that we present in this
work are summarized as follows:
• To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed methodology
in terms of detecting attacks and reducing false alarms.
• To compare the results generated by the proposed
methodology using the single-metric and multi-metric
configurations.
• To determine best possible combination of metrics for
the detection performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, the most relevant previous works are reviewed.
Section III provides an overview of the methods and algo-
rithms used in this work. The proposed BPA generation
methodology is described in Section IV. Section V presents
the network testbed, implementation of attacks, and the
datasets for the evaluation of performance. In Section VI,
the results are discussed and a performance comparison
between single and multi-metric approaches is provided.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Chen and Venkataramanan [17] present a comparative study
between D-S and Bayesian inference as data fusion algo-
rithms, and highlight the benefits of D-S theory. The appli-
cation of D-S for improving the performance of IDSs is an
active research topic. In [18], Chen and Aickelin present
an IDS based on D-S. The beliefs, computed from multiple
features, are combined to obtain an overall belief on whether
the analyzed data corresponds to a malicious event. For each
feature, a threshold is defined to generate the BPA related
to the feature. However, this approach requires a training
phase to determine various thresholds and to compute BPAs.
Hence, this system cannot dynamically adjust to the current
dynamics of the network traffic.
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Xu et al. [11] use Gaussian distribution to construct a
referencemodel for each dataset attribute and each hypothesis
of the D-S framework, based on training datasets. The inter-
section of attributes from each test sample with the normal
distribution of each class is used to define a nested BPA struc-
ture. However, with this nested approach, several singleton
hypotheses may be assigned a null belief value. According
to [18], the presence of null beliefs in the D-S fusion process
can be a detrimental factor on the fused beliefs, as described
by the conflicting belief phenomenon. In our proposed work,
the problem of generating null beliefs is avoided by always
assigning a non-zero belief value to each hypothesis, and
ensuring that the mass functions are positive.
In [13] Fragkiadakis et al. present and evaluate an IDS
for detecting Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by seeking
changes in the signal-to-noise ratio. The value of this single
metric is calculated from distinct nodes running two different
local algorithms, single threshold and cumulative sum. Based
on the collected information, their system generates the BPAs
using a linear function. The BPAs are fused with D-S theory.
In our work, we fuse multiple metrics across the layer stack.
In [4], we previously proposed a novel BPA methodology
tailored to detect wireless injection attacks by adapting to the
current characteristics of the network traffic, without inter-
vention from an IDS administrator. The BPA methodology
uses two independent statistical approaches based on the
Euclidean distance from a defined point of reference, and the
density distribution of the analyzed data. Although, it was
proven to be an efficient BPA methodology, it can benefit
from a new set of methodologies that provide a more rigorous
and well defined mathematical framework.
Other IDSs designed to secure Wi-Fi networks, which do
not exploit data fusion techniques, have also been proposed in
the literature. A framework that aims to detect DoS attacks at
the MAC layer is described in [19]. This framework, which is
based on thresholds, is composed of three main algorithms;
the first one detects and prevents the masquerading of DoS
attacks, the second algorithm mitigates the effect of the DoS
attack in the secured resource, the third algorithm detects
deauthentication, disassociation and MAC spoofing as part
of the DoS attacks. The authors indicate that this framework
is efficient in terms of throughput, recovery time and packet
resend rates. However, it was evaluated using simulated net-
work traffic only, and no evaluation has been performed using
real network traffic.
The work proposed in [20] introduces an open source
IDS for IEEE 802.11 networks operating in infrastructure
mode. The authors indicate that the system is appropriate
for the wireless environment since it does not need to be
deployed on all the network nodes. Furthermore, two types
of attack can be detected; deauthentication attack and evil
twin attack. The detection of both attacks is based on the
use of multiple metrics from the network traffic. Although
this system achieves a detection accuracy of 90% on average
for both deauthentication and evil twin attacks, the False
Positive Rate (FPR) is relatively high and can be improved
by modifying some characteristics of the detection logic, for
instance, by using more indicators.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides an overview of the relevant algo-
rithms used by the proposed methodology, and describes
the mathematical framework associated with each algorithm.
These are the D-S theory, both Gaussian and exponential
pdf, categorical pmf, lrd , k-means clustering, and k-Nearest
Neighbors (k-NN).
A. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY
D-S is a mathematical technique used to combine the
evidence of information from multiple and heterogeneous
sources in order to calculate the overall belief of occurrence of
an event. D-S theory starts by defining a frame of discernment
2 = {θ1, θ2,. . . , θn}, where θn are all possible mutually
exclusive outcomes of a particular problem domain. Let us
consider a problem with a frame of discernment present-
ing two possible outcomes 2 = {A,B}, then the possible
hypotheses for this problem are defined as the power set
{A,B, {A|B},∅} , 22. In the case of {A|B}, this subset corre-
sponds to Uncertainty (either A or B). In addition, ∅ denotes
an empty set. With regards to this work, we want to identify
whether the analyzed network traffic is malicious or non-
malicious. Therefore, the frame of discernment is comprised
of A = Attack and N = Normal.
Each hypothesis is assigned a belief value within the
range [0, 1], also known as BPA, through a mass probability
function m, which expresses the evidence attributed directly
to the hypothesis. This is notated as:
m : 22→ [0, 1] if

m(∅) = 0
m(H ) ≥ 0, ∀ H ⊆ 2∑
H⊆2
m(H ) = 1
(1)
Then, Dempster’s rule of combination is used to calculate
the orthogonal sum of the belief values from two different
observers, and fuses this information into a single belief. This
rule is defined in (2), where m1(H ) and m2(H ) are the beliefs
in the hypothesis H , from observers 1 and 2, respectively.
Similarly, X
⋂
Y = H refers to all combinations of evidence
which yield H ; whereas X
⋂
Y = ∅ refers to the mutually
exclusive subsets of the hypothesis H , thus their intersection
is an empty set.
m(H ) =
∑
X
⋂
Y=H m1(X ) · m2(Y )
1−∑X⋂Y=∅m1(X ) · m2(Y ) ∀ H 6= ∅ (2)
Dempster’s rule allows the combination of evidence from
two observers at a time. In order to combine evidence from
more observers, Dempster’s rule can be used iteratively. The
output of the initial combination process is used as input
evidence in the next iteration, along with the evidence of
information from a third observer. Dempster’s rule satisfies
the associative property, thus the order in which the belief
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values are fused does not affect the final combined belief
values. To practically understand how Dempster’s rule of
combination is implemented, the reader is referred to a prac-
tical example presented in our previous work [4].
B. GAUSSIAN AND EXPONENTIAL PROBABILITY
DENSITY FUNCTION
The Gaussian, or normal distribution N (µ, σ 2), is most
widely used to represent random variables in many applica-
tions. This is because, according to the Central Limit The-
orem (CLT), in most cases, when adding new independent
variables to a sample space, the added values tend to follow
the normal distribution, even if the sample space values are
not normally distributed [21]. The pdf of a Gaussian random
variable x is given as:
f (x | µ, σ 2) = 1√
2piσ 2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (3)
whereµ and σ 2 are the mean and variance of the distribution,
respectively.
A continuous random variable x is said to be exponential
distributed if it has the following probability density function:
f (x | λ) =
{
λe−λx for x ≥ 0
0 for x < 0
(4)
where λ > 0 is the rate of the distribution [22].
C. CATEGORICAL PROBABILITY MASS FUNCTION
The pmf provides the probability that a discrete random
variable xi is equal to a specific value [23]. The categorical
distribution is a discrete probability distribution that defines
probability of a random variable that can take one of k possi-
ble values. For example, Bernoulli distribution has only two,
i.e. k = 2, possible outcomes for the random variable. The
pmf of a categorical random variable is given as:
f (xi | p) = pi (5)
k∑
i=1
pi = 1 (6)
where p = (p1, . . . , pk ), pi is the probability of observing the
outcome i.
D. LOCAL REACHABILITY DENSITY
The lrd is an outlier detection technique based on the density
of the data. The density between objects in an observation
space is obtained by calculating their relative distances. The
relative locality of an object is given by its k nearest neigh-
bors. For the purpose of clustering, objects that have similar
density are considered to belong in the same group. However,
objects that have lower local density than their neighbors are
identified as outliers [15]. Let us assume a test sample X
and a set of k nearest neighbors Nk (X ) of X , the lrd
of X is calculated as follows:
lrd(X ) =
(
|Nk (X )|∑
Y∈Nk (X ) rdk (X ,Y )
)
(7)
where |Nk (X )| is the cardinality of Nk (X ), rdk (X ,Y ) is the
reachability distance of an object X from the k nearest objects
Y ∈ Nk (X ), as defined by (8):
rdk (X ,Y ) = max{d
(
X ,Nk (X )
)
, d
(
X ,Y
)} (8)
where d
(
X ,Nk (X )
)
is the distance of the kth nearest neighbor
of the object X , d(X ,Y ) is the distance between X and each
of the objects Y ∈ Nk (X ).
E. k-MEANS CLUSTERING
The k-means clustering is a technique used to group the
observation space comprising of n samples into k different
clusters. This unsupervised learning technique is used when
the data is not labeled. Given a k number of clusters, the aim
of k-means is to cluster each object into one of the k clusters.
Let us consider a finite d-dimensional feature space S =
C1 ∪ C2 ∪ . . . ∪ Ck = xn ∈ Rd , where k is the number
of clusters Ci (i = 1, 2, . . . , k), and n is the number of
data instances. The k-means optimization problem is defined
in (9):
min
C1∪C2∪...∪Ck
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
∥∥∥∥x − 1|Ci| ∑xj∈Ci xj
∥∥∥∥2 (9)
Although the initial centroids can be chosen randomly,
in this work we utilize the algorithm k-means++ to pick
initial centroids, in order to improve the running time of the
algorithm. k-means++ selects the first centroid randomly,
then the next centroid is chosen based on a probability related
to the distance to the first centroid [24]. A simple description
of k-means clustering algorithm is provided below:
1) The initial k centroids or seeds are randomly selected.
2) The Euclidean distance between each centroid and all
data instances is calculated.
3) Each data instance is assigned to the closest centroid
forming the clusters.
4) For each cluster, a new centroid is selected based on
the average distance between data instances within the
cluster.
5) Steps 2-4 are repeated until convergence of centroids.
F. k-NEAREST NEIGHBOURS
k-NN is a simple machine learning approach used for pattern
recognition, either for classification or regression [25]. The
k closest samples to the test object in the feature space are
selected as an input, where k is a positive integer. In classifi-
cation, the k-NN process returns a class to which the sample
belongs. The decision is based on a voting among the k closest
samples to the object according to the Euclidean distance.
In regression, the k-NN process returns a property value
assigned to the sample. This value is based on the average
value of the k closest samples values.
In k-NN, a weight can be added to the participation of each
neighbor. In doing so, the closer samples participate more
to the final decision than the farther ones. Usually a weight
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of 1/d is assigned to each neighbor, where d is the distance
between the object and the neighbor [26].
IV. PROPOSED BPA METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methodology that we propose to
generate the BPA values. This methodology examines several
metrics of the wireless network frames. Through manual
forensics analysis, out of the all availablemetrics, fivemetrics
have been empirically selected as the most appropriate for
detecting the attacks. These are the Received Signal Strength
Indication (RSSI), Injection Rate (Rate), Network Alloca-
tion Vector (NAV), MAC layer sequence number difference
between two consecutive frames (Seq) and arrival time dif-
ference between two consecutive frames (IAT)
The proposed methodology comprises of two main stages.
First, both Gaussian and exponential pdf, and categorical pmf
are utilized to compute the belief in Normal. Additionally,
lrd is utilized to compute the belief in Attack . Second, the dif-
ferent BPAs are fused using D-S, and the final detection
decision is taken.
A. METHOD TO ASSIGN BELIEF IN NORMAL
The belief in the hypothesis Normal indicates how strong
the belief is that the current analyzed data is non-malicious.
In order to assign the belief in Normal, we make use of both
Gaussian and exponential pdf, and categorical pmf.
The method to assign the BPA in Normal undergoes three
main steps: 1) Outlier filtering, 2) Calculating the reference
of normality, 3) Assigning the belief in Normal, based on a
single-metric value of the current network frame. The first
two steps utilize the metric values of the previous n frames
to the current frame. A description of all three steps is given
below.
1) OUTLIER FILTERING
The main purpose of this step is to build a base-
line of normality. This step uses k-means cluster-
ing to filter significant outliers in the analyzed data
(i.e. baseline data). Then, the remaining data resulting after
discarding the outliers (i.e. clean data), is used to build more
accurate baseline of normality. The k-means algorithm is
applied on all five metrics of the frames in the baseline
data. Assuming that the majority of the network traffic is
non-malicious, the cluster with greater number of frames
is considered to comprise non-malicious frames, and the
smaller cluster is considered to comprise malicious frames.
Let us consider a finite d-dimensional feature space
S = C1 ∪ C2, where S is the baseline data, k = 2,
C1 = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} is the class for non-malicious data,
C2 = {xm+1, xm+2, . . . , xm+l} is the class for malicious data,
n = m+ l is the number of frames considered previous to the
currently analyzed frame, xi ∈ Rd (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), m is the
number of non-malicious frames, l is the number of malicious
frames. The outlier filtering step, applying (9), is expected
to produce a d-dimensional feature space F = C1 ∪ C ′2 ={x1, x2, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , xm+g}, where F is the clean data
and g l, i.e. all or most data that compriseC2 should be dis-
carded from the original dataset. The experiments conducted
in this work considers the feature space of dimension d = 5,
where each network frame is a vector of five metrics. The
clean data is used in the next step of this phase to calculate
the reference of normality.
One condition that should be met, for statistical reliability,
is that the baseline data should be n ≥ 30. This is the min-
imum number of frames required for estimating the param-
eters mean µ and variance σ 2 of the Gaussian distribution
and rate parameter λ of the exponential distribution [27].
Algorithm 1 provides the implementation pseudo-code of the
first step of the belief assignment method.
Algorithm 1 Implementation Pseudo-Code of the First Step
of the Belief Assignment on the Hypothesis Normal
1: Get a single-metric value (x) from the current frame
2: Get baseline data (all metrics from previous n frames)
3:
4: Outlier Filtering
5: Input: baseline data = C1 ∪ C2
6: Select, initially, centroids (c1 and c2) using k-means++
7: do
8: Calculate distance from c1 and c2 to all the frames
9: d(c, x) =
√∑n
i=1(c− xi)2
10: Assign all frames to the closest centroid (c1 or c2)
11: Per cluster, identify a new centroid
12: d(c, x)/n
13: while c1 and c2 change
14: Remove outlier cluster
15: Output: clean data = C1 ∪ C ′2 = (C ′2  C2)
2) CALCULATING THE REFERENCE OF NORMALITY
The main purpose of this step is to define a reference of nor-
mality for calculating the BPA in Normal. This step utilizes
Gaussian pdf for RSSI and Seq metrics, exponential pdf for
IAT and categorical pmf for Rate and NAV.
For the metrics RSSI (measured in dBm) and Seq metrics,
the underlying pdf of the metric values (i.e. the probability
of occurrence of any metric sample) can be obtained as
described in (3), based on the estimation of the µ and σ 2 for
each metric from the clean data. The reference of normality
is defined by the value with the maximum probability pmax ,
which is the probability value, when x coincides with µ:
pmax = f (µ) = 1√
2piσ 2
(10)
For the metric IAT, based on the estimation of λ from the
metric values in the clean data, the underlying pdf of the
metric values can be obtained as in (4). The reference of
normality is defined by the value with the maximum proba-
bility pmax , which coincides with f (xmin|λ), where xmin is the
minimum value of the metric IAT in the clean data. When
xmin = 0, then pmax = λ according to (4).
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Finally, for each of the metrics, Rate and NAV, the empir-
ical probability (relative frequency) of each unique value is
computed. Based on (5) and (6), the empirical probability
of a unique value xi is the absolute frequency of the unique
value (ni), normalized by the total number of themetric values
in the clean data, N .
f (xi | p) = niN (11)
The references of normality for RSSI, Seq, and IAT,
and the empirical probabilities for Rate, and NAV are used
when assigning the belief in Normal to the current frame,
as explained in the next step. Algorithm 2 provides the
implementation pseudo-code of the second step of the belief
assignment method.
Algorithm 2 Implementation Pseudo-Code of the Second
Step of the Belief Assignment on the Hypothesis Normal
1: Calculating the Reference of Normality
2: Input: Single-metric values xi of the frames in clean data
3:
4: For metrics RSSI and Seq:
5: Calculate µ and σ of the single-metric values xi
6: for each xi; (i=1,2,...,m+g) do
7: f (xi | µ, σ 2) = 1√2piσ 2 e
− (xi−µ)2
2σ2
8: end for
9: Find reference of normality (pmax)
10: pmax = f (µ) = 1√2piσ 2
11:
12: For metric IAT:
13: Calculate µ of the single-metric values xi
14: for each xi; (i=1,2,...,m+g) do
15: f (xi | λ) =
{
λe−λx for xi ≥ 0
0 for xi < 0
16: end for
17: Find reference of normality (pmax)
18: pmax = f (xmin | λ)
19:
20: For metrics Rate and NAV:
21: Find the set of unique values (X ), frequency of each
unique value (ni) and the total number of values (N ).
22: for each unique value xi ∈ X do
23: f (xi | p) = niN
24: end for
25: Output: pmax or f (xi | p)
3) BELIEF ASSIGNMENT IN NORMAL
This step provides the belief value in Normal. For the metrics
RSSI and Seq, the probability of the currently analyzedmetric
value f (xi), calculated using (3), is normalized by pmax given
by (10), as illustrated in Fig. 1. Thus, the belief in Normal for
these metrics is computed as:
m(N ) = f (xi)
f (µ)
(12)
FIGURE 1. Illustration of a generic Gaussian pdf, definition of the
reference of normality f (µ), and calculation of the probability of the
currently analyzed metric value f (x). Given a metric value x , assigning
the belief in Normal to the current frame, based on Gaussian pdf.
For themetric IAT, the probability of the currently analyzed
IAT value f (xi), given by (4), is normalized with the value
pmax . As explained in the previous step, for IAT, pmax =
f (xmin). Thus, the belief in Normal, is computed as:
m(N ) = f (xi)
f (xmin)
(13)
This step can update the reference of normality (pmax) for
the metrics RSSI, Seq and IAT. The value of pmax is updated
when the computed f (xi) of the currently analyzed value is
greater than the current reference. In that case, the updated
reference of normality would be pmax = f (xi). Fig. 2 repre-
sents the assignment of the belief in Normal to the current
frame, based on the exponential pdf.
FIGURE 2. Illustration of the exponential pdf, definition of the reference
of normality f (xmin), and calculation of the probability of the currently
analyzed metric value f (x), where f (xmin) = λ. Given a metric value x ,
assigning the belief in Normal to the current frame based on
exponential pdf.
Regarding the metrics Rate and NAV, the belief in Normal
is assigned to the current frame based on the empirical prob-
abilities computed by (11) in the previous step. When the
analyzed value (xi) is equal to one of the unique values in
the clean data, the belief in Normal is assigned as:
m(N ) = pi (14)
In contrast, when the analyzed value (xi) is not equal to
any of the unique values in the clean data, the belief in
Normal is assigned to an arbitrarily small value. As previ-
ously explained in Section II, the presence of null beliefs in
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theD-S fusion process can be a detrimental factor on the fused
beliefs. Fig. 3 depicts the assignment of the belief in Normal
to the current frame, based on categorical pmf. Algorithm 3
provides the implementation pseudo-code of the third step of
the belief assignment method.
FIGURE 3. Illustration of the categorical pmf, normalized by the total
number of the metric values (N). Given the unique metric values
x1, x2, . . . xi with frequencies n1,n2, . . .ni , respectively, the BPA in
Normal to the current frame, based on the current analyzed
value xi , is ni /N .
Algorithm 3 Implementation Pseudo-Code of the Third Step
of the Belief Assignment on the Hypothesis Normal
1: Belief Assignment in Normal
2: Input: Single-metric value x of the current frame
3: For metrics RSSI and Seq:
4: Compute f (x) based on the Gaussian pdf
5: Calculate Belief in Normal, m(N )
6: m(N ) = f (x)/f (µ) = f (x)/pmax
7:
8: For metric IAT :
9:
10: Compute f (x) based on the exponential pdf
11: Calculate Belief in Normal, m(N )
12: m(N ) = f (x)/f (xmin) = f (x)/pmax
13:
14: For metrics Rate and NAV :
15: if x ∈ X then m(N ) = f (x | p) = nN
16: else m(N ) = 0
17: end if
18:
19: Output: m(N )
B. METHOD TO ASSIGN BELIEF IN ATTACK
The belief in the hypothesis Attack indicates how strong
the belief is that the current analyzed data are malicious.
In order to assign the belief in Attack , we propose using the
lrd technique. As previously explained in Section III-D,
the lrd is an outlier detection technique. Therefore, this tech-
nique is an ideal methodology to assign the belief in Attack .
The proposed methodology to assign the BPA depends on
the comparison between the local density of a frame and its
k-NNs among the previous n frames within the baseline data.
This methodology undergoes two main steps: 1) Calculat-
ing the reference of abnormal traffic, and 2) Assigning the
belief in Attack , utilizing the lrd . A description of the two
steps is given below. Algorithm 4 provides the implementa-
tion pseudo-code of the belief assignment for the hypothesis
Attack .
1) CALCULATING THE REFERENCE OF ABNORMAL TRAFFIC
This step starts by removing duplicate features from the
baseline data. This is because duplication would introduce
instability caused by the distance value of zero, when calcu-
lating lrd in the following steps. As a result, a new dataset
called unique data is generated.
This step can be divided into the following five points:
1) Remove duplicate features from the baseline data, and
generate unique data.
2) For each frame in the unique data, the k-NNs are found.
3) For each of the neighbors found in step 2), the k-NN
are also found.
4) For each frame, the lrd is calculated based on (7).
5) The maximum lrd value (i.e. lrdmax) is selected as the
reference of abnormal traffic.
Points 2-4 are repeated for each metric in the unique data.
Fig. 4 shows a comparison between the local density of an
object A with its three nearest neighbors. As can be seen,
the objectA has amuch lower local density than its neighbors.
FIGURE 4. A comparison between the local density of A with its three
nearest neighbors. Given k = 3, A has a much lower local density than its
3 neighbors. This means that the belief in Attack assigned to the network
frame based on A is higher than the beliefs assigned based on
the 3 neighbors.
Due to the computational cost that would entail to have a
large number of nearest neighbors, we have experimentally
chosen kmax = 20 for the k-NN algorithm. If the number of
the unique values (v) is less than or equal to kmax , then the
number of nearest neighbors is set as k = v. Otherwise, k is
set as k = kmax .
The lrd for the currently analyzed frame lrd(xi) is calcu-
lated as described in (7). If lrd(xi) is larger than the reference
of abnormal traffic lrdmax , then the reference of abnormal
traffic is updated as lrdmax = lrd(xi).
2) BELIEF ASSIGNMENT IN ATTACK
This step provides the belief value in Attack . Once the lrd
for the currently analyzed frame, lrd(xi), and the reference of
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abnormal traffic, lrdmax , have been calculated, the belief in
Attack assigned to the currently analyzed frame xi is calcu-
lated as follows:
m(A) =
(
1− lrd(xi)
lrdmax
)
(15)
Thus, the frame with the lowest lrd(xi) would receive the
highest belief in Attack .
Algorithm 4 Implementation Pseudo-Code of the Belief
Assignment on the Hypothesis Attack
1: Get a single-metric value (xi) from the current frame
2: Get baseline data (all metrics from previous n frames)
3:
4: 1) Calculating the Reference of Abnormal Traffic
5: Input: baseline data
6: Remove duplicates in baseline data
7:
8: if m ≤ kmax then
9: k = m
10: else
11: k = kmax
12: end if
13: for each unique single-metric value do
14: Find the k-NN
15: for each previous k nearest neighbour do
16: Find the k-NN
17: end for
18: Calculate lrd
19: end for
20: Output: lrdmax
21: Calculate the local reachability density lrd(xi)
22: if lrd(xi) > lrdmax then
23: lrdmax = lrd(xi)
24: end if
25:
26: 2) Belief Assignment in Attack
27: Input: lrd(xi) and lrdmax
28: Calculate Belief in Attack , m(A)
29: m(A) = (1− (lrd(xi)/lrdmax))
30: Output: m(A)
C. METHOD TO ASSIGN BELIEF IN UNCERTAINTY
Once the BPA values in Normal and Attack have been
assigned, it is also necessary to compute the belief in the
hypothesis Uncertainty. The BPA in Uncertainty is assigned
based on the previously computed belief values (i.e. m(N )
and m(A)), as described in (16). The BPA in Uncertainty
indicates how doubtful the system is regarding whether the
current analyzed data are malicious or non-malicious. The
numerator is the smallest of the two hypotheses, whereas the
denominator is the largest one.
m(U ) = m(A|N ) = min
(
m(A),m(N )
)
max
(
m(A),m(N )
) (16)
D. FUSION OF BELIEFS AND DETECTION DECISION
As described early on in this Section, the second stage of
the proposed approach conducts the fusion of beliefs using
D-S theory. This stage also aims to make the final decision
on whether the network frame is actually malicious or not.
To meet the requirements of D-S theory, all the conditions
listed in (1) have to be met. In particular, we need to ensure
that the addition of all the belief values is equal to 1. In order
to satisfy this condition, we compute the normalization of the
three BPA values, as described in (17).
m(H )′ = m(H )∑
H⊆2
m(H )
∀ H ⊆ 2 (17)
Then, the BPA values assigned by all the observers
are fused according to the Dempster’s rule of combina-
tion (2). The outcome of the D-S theory is a complete set of
BPA values (i.e. one for each hypothesis initially consid-
ered). The analyzed information is classified according to the
hypothesis with the highest BPA, which is considered to be
the correct decision. Algorithm 5 depicts the implementation
pseudo-code of the fusion of beliefs and the detection process.
E. SINGLE METRIC ATTACK DETECTION
As previously explained, IDSs that make use of multi-
ple metrics in a cross-layers approach may improve their
efficiency. Nonetheless, we also investigate whether using
the BPAs assigned to single metrics could be used to
produce more accurate detection results than multi-metric
approaches.
By computing the BPAs as described in Section IV,
the proposed approach could classify the network frames
as normal or malicious, based on the belief values gener-
ated from a single metric only. If the belief in Normal is
greater than or equal to the belief in Attack , m(N ) ≥ m(A),
the currently analyzed frame would be classified as normal.
Otherwise, if the belief in Normal is smaller than the belief
in Attack the currently analyzed frame would be classified as
malicious.
V. TESTBED AND NETWORK TRAFFIC MEASUREMENTS
A. EXPERIMENTAL TESTBED WLAN
The performance of the proposed BPA methodology has
been evaluated on an experimental IEEE 802.11 network
testbed, which was set up in our laboratory. As shown
in Fig. 5, the experimental testbed consists of a wireless
client machine connecting to the Internet through a legitimate
Access Point (AP). Another machine is used as an attacker
using the suite of hacking tools Aircrack [28]. The client
machine and the attacker were running Linux and all the
devices except from the Linksys WRT54GL AP used the
Atheros chipset in their wireless cards.
B. WIRELESS INJECTION ATTACKS
The two different network traffic datasets, used in this work,
have been made publicly available in [16], including the
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Algorithm 5 Implementation Pseudo-Code of the Belief
Assignment on the Hypothesis Uncertainty and Beliefs
Fusion
1: 1) Calculating Uncertainty
2: Input: Belief in Normal and Attack assigned to ith frame;
i = 1, 2, . . . , r is the number of selected features
3: mi(N ), mi(A)
4: for metric = 1→ r do
5: mi(U ) = min
(
mi(A),mi(N )
)
/max
(
mi(A),mi(N )
)
6: end for
7: Output: mi(U )
8:
9: 2) Beliefs Adjustment
10: Input: Beliefs set assigned to ith frame
11: mi(N ), mi(A), mi(U )
12: for metric = 1→ r do
13: mi(H )′ = mi(H )/∑H⊆2 mi(H )
14: end for
15: Output: mi(N )′, mi(A)′, mi(U )′
16:
17: 3) Beliefs Fusion
18: Input: Adjusted beliefs set assigned to ith frame
19: mi(N )′, mi(A)′, mi(U )′
20: for metric = 1→ r do
21: Apply Dempster’s rule of combination (2)
22: m(H ) = mi(H )⊕mi+1(H ) ∀ H ⊆ 2
23: end for
24: Output: m(N ),m(A),m(U )
25:
26: 4) Network Traffic Classification
27: Input: Fused beliefs set
28: m(N ),m(A),m(U )
29: if m(N ) ≥ m(A) then
30: Currently analysed frame classified as normal
31: else
32: Classified as malicious
33: end if
34: Output: Network frame classification
FIGURE 5. Logical topology of the IEEE 802.11 network testbed; one
wireless client machine connecting to the Internet, one legitimate AP,
and one attacker implementing the wireless injection attacks.
ground truth. Each of these dataset includes traces of one type
of wireless injection attack. These types are MitM attack at
the physical layer, and deauthentication attack.
1) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK AT THE PHYSICAL LAYER
To implement theMitM attack, the Airpwn tool [29] was used
by the attacker to launch the attack. This software can be
found as part of the suite of penetration testing tools Aircrack.
Airpwn eavesdrops the transmitted frames in aWiFi network,
analyses this information and injects malicious frames into
the wireless channel. If Airpwn identifies an HTTP request
from a legitimate wireless node, it injects its own crafted
HTML code, spoofing the TCP sequence number and the
MAC address of the legitimate AP.
This tool takes advantage of the time required by the server
to respond to legitimate website requests. The nature of this
MitM attack requires the victim to be located within the
wireless coverage area of the attacks. Since there are no hops
between the attacker and the victim, it takes the attacker much
less time to respond to legitimate website requests than the
web server. When the client receives the response from the
attacker, it assumes the response as legitimate and processes
the injected code. The future response from the legitimate
web server would be discarded by the victim as it assumes
the original request has already been received.
2) DEAUTHENTICATION ATTACK
The deauthentication attack has also been investigated in
this work. To implement this attack, the Aircrack tool [28]
was used by the attacker to inject deauthentication frames
to the wireless network traffic. The attacker injects spoofed
deauthentication frames with the purpose of forcing the client
to re-establish a connection with the AP. The attacker spoofs
its MAC address to deceive the victim that the frames are
coming from the authorized AP.
This type of attack is commonly utilized in DoS
attacks but also constitutes the first step of breaking into
WPA2 encrypted wireless networks. In the latter case,
the attacker injects a few spoofed deauthentication frames
with the purpose of forcing the client to re-establish a connec-
tionwith theAP.At a later stage and offline, the attacker could
succeed in cracking WPA2 by applying brute force or dictio-
nary attack techniques.
C. NETWORK TRAFFIC FEATURES
The relevant network traffic has been monitored and gath-
ered by the client machine using the network packets ana-
lyzer tcpdump [30] in pcap format. Two datasets have been
gathered from a real IEEE 802.11 network testbed shown
in Fig. 5. The first dataset contains traces of the MitM attack
at the physical layer, whereas the second dataset contains
traces of the deauthentication attack. The MitM dataset com-
prises 14493 instances of which 93.1% (13498 frames) is
normal and 6.9% (995 frames) is malicious. The Deauthen-
tication dataset comprises 228 instances of which 71.93%
(164 frames) is normal and 28.07% (64 frames) is mali-
cious. It is worth noting that in our experimental evaluation,
the ground truth was used only for evaluation purposes and
was not used during the detection process.
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The network analyzer TShark [31] was used to extract
different metrics from the frame in the captured pcap files.
These metrics are Rate, NAV , Seq and IAT . Since the
implemented MitM attack affects only the data frames , man-
agement and control frames were not considered in the MitM
attack detection process. On the other hand, only manage-
ment frames were used during the detection of deauthentica-
tion attack, which are the type of frames used to conduct this
attack.
The metrics RSSI , Seq and IAT for the MitM dataset are
represented in Figs. 6-8. The section in blue corresponds
to the non-malicious traffic, whereas the section in red cor-
responds to the traces of MitM attack. The Y-axis of the
figures represents the respective metric, whereas the X-axis
of the figures represents the number of captured network
frames. As seen in Fig. 6, even though both the attacker
and the authorized AP manifest themselves in their own
range of RSSI values, we cannot clearly define a threshold
to differentiate between normal and malicious traffic. This
is because in some network frames, such as the ones around
the 5000th frame, there is an overlap of RSSI values between
the normal and attack traffic. For the metrics Seq and IAT ,
as shown in Figs. 7-8 respectively, the nature of both metrics
does not allow us to define what values correspond either to
normal or malicious traffic, as there are spikes in both types
of traffic.
FIGURE 6. RSSI - Received signal strength measured by the victim
machine during implementation of the MitM attack.
VI. EVALUATION OF RESULTS
This section describes the off-line detection results, and com-
pares the results generated by the proposed methodology
using all the possible combinations of metrics. There are two
main purposes of these results. First, to evaluate the efficiency
of the proposed methodology in identifying the presence
of attacks, and producing reduced number of false alarms.
Second, to identify which of the possible combinations of
metrics produces the best detection results.
The effectiveness of the proposed methodology has been
evaluated using the following performance metrics, which
provide evidence of how effective an IDS is at making correct
detections:
FIGURE 7. Seq - MAC layer Sequence Number Difference between two
consecutive frames, measured by the victim machine during
implementation of the MitM attack.
FIGURE 8. IAT - Inter arrival time difference between two consecutive
frames, measured by the victim machine during implementation of the
MitM attack.
• True Positive Rate (TPR) or Detection Rate - Proportion
of malicious frames correctly classified among all the
malicious data:
TPR = TP
TP+ FN (18)
• False Positive Rate (FPR) - Proportion of normal data
misclassified as malicious among all the normal data:
FPR = FP
TN + FP (19)
• Overall Success Rate (OSR) or Accuracy - Proportion of
frames correctly classified among all the data:
OSR = TP+ TN
TP+ FP+ TN + FN (20)
• Precision - Proportion of malicious frames correctly
classified among all the alarms generated:
Precision = TP
TP+ FP (21)
• F-score - Tradeoff between Precision and TPR, used to
compare two distinctive classification methodologies:
F-score = 2 · Precision · TPR
Precision+ TPR (22)
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where True Positive (TP) represents attacks classified as
attacks; True Negative (TN) represents normal instances
classified as normal; False Positive (FP) represents normal
instances misclassified as attack; and False Negative (FN)
represents attacks misclassified as normal.
We have divided the datasets in 80% for training
(i.e. train data) and 20% for testing (i.e. test data). The
training dataset was used to build the normality and attack
baselines (i.e. baseline data), whereas the remaining data
were used to generate the beliefs and evaluate the proposed
methodology.
A. SINGLE METRIC DETECTION PERFORMANCE
This section presents the initial performance evaluation of
the proposed methodology, which focuses on the assessment
of the single metric based attack detection, as described in
Section IV-E. For all the five considered features, the pro-
posed approach could classify the network frames as nor-
mal or malicious, based on the belief values generated for
each single metric.
1) DETECTION OF MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
The detection results for theMitM attack, based on individual
metric, are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, there are two
metrics that provide outstanding performance. These are Rate
and NAV . The single metric NAV generates perfect detection
results, 100% TPR and 0% FPR. Regarding the metric Rate,
it produces perfect TPR (i.e. 100%) and only 0.18% FPR.
Regarding the remaining three metrics, despite generating
relatively low FPR (i.e. reaching 8.24%), none of the metrics
produce acceptable results in terms of TPR. The TPR for
metrics RSSI and IAT are 49.01% and 79.72% respectively,
whereas the TPR for Seq reaches only 34.93%. In terms of
Precision, the metrics RSSI , IAT and Seq produce 57.62%,
60.99% and 50.2%, respectively.
TABLE 1. Man-in-the-Middle attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using single metric detection configuration.
The reasons that justify the good performance of these two
metrics are related to the implementation of the MitM attack
by the Airpwn tool. For instance, the attacker constantly
transmits at a low transmission rate (i.e. 1 Mbps) to achieve a
higher throughput in the wireless communication. This trans-
mission rate would usually be different from the rate, used
to transmit data frame, by the legitimate wireless devices.
Similarly, the actual NAV value set by the transmitters in a
wireless network is correlatedwith the used transmission rate.
Since the attacker would use a low transmission rate, the
NAV value set by the attacker would equivalently be larger
than the NAV value set by the legitimate wireless devices.
From the presented results, it would be expected to use
the single metric methodology using either Rate or NAV to
defend the wireless network againstMitM attacks at the phys-
ical layer. Nonetheless, the detection system cannot assume
the implementation parameters chosen by the attacker. More
importantly, it is impossible to anticipate the particular type
of attack implemented by the attacker. Hence, basing the
wireless injection attack detection on the use of single metric
may be prone to a high number of misclassification results.
2) DETECTION OF DEAUTHENTICATION ATTACK
The detection results for the deauthentication attack, based
on individual metric, is presented in Table 2. Regarding the
deauthentication attack detection, one noticeable result is
produced by the single metric Rate. In contrast to the case
of MitM attack in which Rate produces 100% TPR, for the
deauthentication attack detection, the same metric generates
0% TPR and 2.44% FPR. It is also remarkable the detection
results for RSSI , which produces 0% FPR. This is the best
FPR results of all the evaluated metrics for deauthentica-
tion attack. Apart from IAT, which reaches 19.51% FPR, all
metrics generate low rate of false alarms, reaching 5% FPR.
Nevertheless, thesemetrics have poor results in terms of TPR,
except for NAV . Once again, the best overall detection results
are produced by the single metric NAV , with 100% TPR and
only 5% FPR. The OSR, Precision and F-score for this metric
are 96.83%, 91.67% and 0.96, respectively.
TABLE 2. Deauthentication attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using single metric detection configuration.
The good performance produced by the single metric
NAV is explained by the large NAV value set by the attacker,
as explained in the case of MitM attack. However, the per-
formance drop in the case of Rate is justified by the fact
that the AP also transmits at a very low transmission rate the
control and management frames. Therefore, distinguishing
between normal and malicious traffic, based only on single
metric Rate becomes extremely complicated in the case of
deauthentication attack.
These results highlight the fact that the use of singlemetrics
configuration to detect the presence of wireless injection
attacks may be inefficient against different type of attacks.
Therefore, we argue that a multi-metric approach would
address such issues.
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FIGURE 9. Bar char for the MitM attack detection results for all possible metrics combinations; TPR in green, FPR in red, and
OSR blue.
FIGURE 10. Bar char for the deauthentication attack detection results for all possible metrics combinations; TPR in green, FPR
in red, and OSR blue.
B. MULTI-METRIC DETECTION PERFORMANCE
This section presents the multi-metric attack detection evalu-
ation of the proposed methodology for all the possible com-
binations of metrics. The best results overall are expected in
the case where all the possible metrics are combined.
The detection results of the proposed methodology,
for all possible metrics combinations, have been plotted
in Figs. 9-10. These figures, in the form of bar chart,
present the TPR, FPR and OSR results in three sep-
arate bars, for each metrics combination. The X-axis
represents the particular metrics combination, whereas the
Y-axis represents the detection result in percentage. The
TPR is represented in green, the FPR in red, and the OSR is
blue.
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1) DETECTION OF MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
The MitM attack detection results of the proposed methodol-
ogy, for all possible metrics combinations, have been plot-
ted in Fig. 9. For the case of two-metrics combination,
the combination Rate & NAV generates the best detection
results, with 100% TPR and 0.18% FPR. The two met-
rics that produce the best single metric results for MitM
attack detection would also produce the best detection results
when combined. Furthermore, the two-metric combinations
RSSI & Rate, RSSI & NAV, Rate & IAT and NAV & IAT also
provide considerably good detection results. All thesemetrics
combinations produce 100% TPR. In terms of FPR, these
two-metric combinations generate 5.33%, 5.83%, 7.69%, and
8.19%, respectively. A common factor to all these metrics
combinations is the presence of either RSSI or NAV. This
shows that the contributions of these two metrics dominate
the detection and, in turn, improve the results.
On the other hand, metrics combinations such as RSSI &
Seq produce poor detection results in terms of TPR
(i.e. 36.06%). Because these two metrics generate low
TPR during the single metric detection, it is expected that
this metrics combination would also perform poorly. All the
detection results for the two-metrics combinations have been
tabulated in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Man-in-the-Middle attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using two-metrics combination detection
configuration.
The detection results for all the three-metrics combina-
tions have been tabulated in Table 4. For this number of
metrics, the best detection results are produced by both RSSI,
Rate & IAT and RSSI, NAV & IAT. Both metrics combina-
tions produce 100% TPR, 3.96% FPR and 96.59% OSR. All
the remaining combinations, except from RSSI, Rate & Seq,
RSSI, NAV & Seq and RSSI, Seq & IAT, provide 100% TPR.
However, these metrics combinations also generate slightly
higher FPR results, reaching 10.29% FPR in the case of Rate,
Seq & IAT.
These results show that, as more metrics are combined,
the overall efficiency of the proposed detection methodology,
in terms of TPR, improves among most of the metrics com-
binations. Nonetheless, there is also a slight overall increase
in terms of FPR. This phenomenon can be interpreted as that
the detection methodology becomes more sensitive as more
metrics are used during the detection process. In other words,
TABLE 4. Man-in-the-Middle attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using three-metrics combination detection
configuration.
the BPA in Attack generally increases, and more malicious
frames are correctly classified, but also more normal frames
are misclassified as malicious.
For the case of four-metrics combination, all the com-
binations achieve perfect detection, in terms of TPR
(i.e. 100%). The best detection results overall are obtained by
the combination of RSSI, Rate, NAV & IAT, which produces
3.96% FPR and 96.59% OSR. Only the combination of Rate,
NAV, Seq & IAT provides FPR results higher than 5.69%.
The detection results for the four-metrics and five-metrics
combinations have been tabulated in Table 5. Similar to
the analysis presented about the three-metrics combination,
as more metrics are combined, the overall efficiency of the
proposed detection methodology, in terms of TPR, improves
among most of the metrics combinations.
TABLE 5. Man-in-the-Middle attack detection results generated by
the proposed methodology, using four-metrics and five-metrics
combination detection configuration.
Finally, the combination of five metrics RSSI, Rate, NAV,
Seq & IAT provides 100% TPR, 4.23% FPR, 96.36% OSR
and 0.88 F-score.
2) DETECTION OF DEAUTHENTICATION ATTACK
The deauthentication attack detection results of the proposed
methodology, for all possible metrics combinations, have
been plotted in Fig. 10. For the case of two-metrics com-
bination, the combinations RSSI & NAV, Rate & NAV, and
NAV & Seq generate the best detection results, with 100%
TPR and 2.44% FPR. Once again, the metric that generated
the best results in the single metric configuration (i.e. NAV ),
is present in all these two-metric combinations. Although the
metrics combination NAV & IAT also produces 100% TPR,
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the detection results in terms of FPR reach 19.51%. It is
notable that the combinations RSSI & Seq and RSSI & IAT
do not generate any false alarm (i.e. 0% FPR). However,
their F-score is less than 0.78 due to the low detection rate
(i.e. 63.64% and 27.27% TPR, respectively). The detection
results for the two-metric combinations have been tabulated
in Table 6.
TABLE 6. Deauthentication attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using two-metrics combination detection
configuration.
The detection results for all the three-metrics combinations
have been tabulated in Table 7. In this case, the best detection
results are produced by RSSI, Rate & NAV, RSSI, NAV & Seq
and Rate, NAV & Seq, with 100% TPR and 98.41% OSR.
Although both sets Rate, NAV & IAT and NAV, Seq & IAT
also provide 100% TPR, they produce a high number of
FPR, causing a low Precision of 73.33%. For all the different
combinations, the metric NAV seems to generally improve
the detection performance. In contrast to the case of MitM
attack, the inclusion of the metric Rate drastically degrades
the performance of the deauthentication attack detection.
TABLE 7. Deauthentication attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using three-metrics combination detection
configuration.
The detection results for the four-metrics and five-metrics
combinations have been tabulated in Table 8. For the case
of four-metrics combination, apart from the set RSSI, Rate,
Seq & IAT, all the combinations achieve detection rate larger
than 90.91%. Two of these sets, RSSI, NAV, Seq & IAT and
Rate, NAV, Seq & IAT, achieve 100% TPR. In particular,
TABLE 8. Deauthentication attack detection results generated by the
proposed methodology, using four-metric and five-metric combination
detection configuration.
the combination RSSI, NAV, Seq & IAT generates the best
detection results, with only 2.44% FPR and F-score of 0.85.
Similar to what was discussed for the case of MitM attack
detection, as more metrics are combined, the overall effi-
ciency of the proposed detection methodology, in terms of
TPR, improves among most of the metrics combinations.
Additionally, in the case of deauthentication attack detection,
the FPR remains generally low, with 2.44% for almost all the
four-metric combinations.
Finally, the five-metric combination provides 100% TPR,
2.44% FPR, 98.41% OSR and F-score of 0.98. These results
coincide with the best detection overall across all the possible
metrics combinations, for the detection of the deauthentica-
tion attack.
C. SINGLE AND MULTI-METRIC PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON
This section provides a comparison analysis between the
performance of the single-metric and multi-metric configura-
tions for the detection methodology that we propose. Table 9
presents the detection results, of the single-metric and five-
metric combination configurations, for the detection of MitM
and deauthentication attack. In the case of single-metric,
only the metrics that generate the best detection results are
included, NAV and Rate.
TABLE 9. A Performance comparison between single and multi-metric
detection.
If we focus only on the detection of the MitM attack with
single metric, these results may lead to the conclusion that the
use of single metric is enough for the detection of wireless
injection attacks. This is true for this particular attack and
the metrics NAV and Rate. Nonetheless, these results are not
always consistent when detecting other types of injection
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attacks. For instance, the use of the single metric Rate to
detect deauthentication attack leads to 0% TPR. On the other
hand, for these types of attack, the use of single metric NAV
provides high detection results.
It can be argued that the configuration of the detection
methodology can be adapted to the particular type of attack
being detected. However, it is impossible to know beforehand
the type of attack that the protected environment is going
to face. Therefore, as we argue in this work, the solution
would be the combined use of multiple metrics during the
attack detection. As we can see in Table 9, the performance of
the five-metric combination provides highly accurate results,
regardless of the type of attack being detected (bothMitM and
deauthentication attack). In both cases, the multi-metric con-
figuration produces 100% TPR and less than 5% FPR. These
results highlight the benefit of using a multi-metric approach
in comparison with the single-metric approach. Hence, there
is an advantage of fusing beliefs from all possible metrics
as this provides robustness against uncertainty, for example
if the type of attack is unknown or if the attacker employs
sophisticated tools to manipulate certain metrics associated
with attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel unsupervised methodology to
dynamically generate the BPA values, based on the use of
Gaussian and exponential pdf, the categorical pmf, and the
lrd. This novel methodology dynamically assigns BPA val-
ues for each metric extracted from Wi-Fi frames, which
appropriately represent the real nature of the analyzed data.
The methodology is employed by an IDS that defends
Wi-Fi networks against different types of injection attacks.
In particular, we have evaluated the proposed methodology
against MitM and deauthentication attacks, using real net-
work traffic data generated using a Wi-Fi network.
Although the use of single metric detection can provide
very accurate detection results, there is not a singlemetric that
is efficient for all types of attacks. The configuration of the
detection methodology ought to be adapted to the particular
type of attack being detected. However, it is impossible to
know beforehand the type of attack that the monitored envi-
ronment may have to face. On the other hand, the combined
use of multiple metrics during the attack detection provides
accurate results, without the need to select beforehand a
specific set of metrics. In the presented results, the multi-
metric configuration produces 100% TPR and less than 5%
FPR for both the MitM and deauthentication attacks. These
results highlight the benefit of using a multi-metric approach
in comparison to the single-metric approach.
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